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PAT-DOWN SEARCHES AND PROTEST CAGES: HOW
SECURITY AT THE 2016 OLYMPIC GAMES COULD
AFFECT FIRST AND FOURTH AMENDMENT
LIBERTIES IN THE CITY OF CHICAGO
I. INTRODUCTION
Hosting the summer Olympic Games is an opportunity coveted by
cities around the globe. The one city fortunate enough to be chosen
to host the Olympiad will have the chance to showcase the promi-
nence of the city and the pride of its citizens, and to promote its values
on an international scale. However, the host city does not attain these
benefits without coinciding burdens. The United States' outlook on
homeland security has become increasingly conservative in the wake
of the terrorists attacks of September 11th, 2001, and Americans have
become tolerant of increased security at large-scale events. Conse-
quently, the tension between national security and individual privacy
has come to a head. Seven years after the attacks on the World Trade
Center, the ideas of civil liberties and national safety have become
notably separated. While some argue that a compromise of one's con-
stitutional rights is valid in the name of security, we as Chicagoans
must be well informed of the risks to our individual rights that will
potentially accompany the Olympics in 2016.
The constitutional rights at highest risk for the sake of security are
the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable search and
seizure and the First Amendment right to free speech and assembly.
Unreasonable and suspicionless searches in the form of pat-downs
have become increasingly common at many types of large scale
events. "Protest pens" have also emerged, which are designated dem-
onstration zones constructed as a form of crowd control.' A number
of courts have questioned the constitutionality of both these prac-
tices-suspicionless pat-down searches 2 and protest pens. 3 Neverthe-
less, a conclusive ruling on the lawfulness of these practices has never
been made, and the fear of terrorist attack will likely influence such
measures at the 2016 Summer Olympics.
1. Susan Rachel Nanes, "The Constitutional Infringement Zone": Protest Pens and Demonstra-
tion Zones at the 2004 National Political Conventions, 66 La. L. Rev. 189, 191 (2005).
2. Johnston v. Tampa Bay Sports Authority, 442 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1264 (M.D. Fla., 2006).
3. Coalition to Protest the Democratic National Convention v. City of Boston, 327 F. Supp. 2d
61 (D. Mass 2004)., Stauber v. City of New York,, No. 03 Civ. 9162 (RWS), 2004 WL 159870
(S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2004).
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If the games take place in Chicago, Washington Park will be the site
of the Olympic Stadium, a temporary facility seating 80,000 where the
opening and closing ceremonies will be held. 4 McCormick Place will
house at least eleven different events, and other venues such as the
All State Arena, the United Center, and Northwestern Stadium will
expand the reach of the games into the west and north suburbs.5 The
Olympic Village that houses the various athletes and international vis-
itors will be located just south of McCormick Place and will create
more than thirty acres of development. 6 These progressive develop-
ments will lead to an increase in security for these areas in particular.
This article analyzes how pat-down searches and protest pens were
implemented in the past, and it attempts to coordinate a rudimentary
security scheme for the 2016 summer Olympics, should they be in Chi-
cago. The end result is a methodology that would minimize the inva-
siveness of security measures at the event and to protect the rights of
game patrons and Chicago civilians alike.
II. UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE-How OUR FOURTH
AMENDMENT RIGHTS MAY BE AFFECTED
In a highly populated urban setting such as downtown Chicago, se-
curity provisions will potentially extend to pedestrians, traffic, and
other Chicagoans not involved in the games in any manner. At-
tendees of the summer games will undoubtedly have to submit to pat-
down searches, and this could conceivably apply anyone within close
proximity of the events. A 2005 National Football League mandate of
mass pat-down searches at all NFL games resulted in a legal backlash7
that illustrated the friction between national and personal securities,
and calls to attention the notion that these concepts may have become
mutually exclusive. Pat-down searches involve patting and rubbing of
the torso and pockets with no skin-to-skin contact.8 People wearing
zippered or buttoned outer-garments must open them and hold the
pockets away from their bodies while security checks for foreign ob-
jects.9 Anyone carrying contraband is detained, and anyone who ref-
uses the search is denied entry into the games.' 0 The NFL mandate is
4. http://www.chicago2O16.orglour-plan/frequently-asked-questions.aspx (last visited January
23. 2009).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Johnston, 442 F. Supp. 2d at 1260.
8. Mike Robinson, Clash over Soldier Field searches goes to court, AP, July 21, 2006.
9. Id.
10. Johnston, 442 F. Supp. 2d at 1260.
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a useful template in assessing how searches are conducted at the Sum-
mer Olympics.
A. Are Pat-Down Searches Constitutional?
1. Johnston v. Tampa Sports Authority and the "Special Needs"
Exception
The Fourth Amendment protects the interests of one's person and
property by prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures, the gen-
eral principle being that warrantless searches must be based on indi-
vidual suspicion." This rule applies to intrusive pat-downs. A search
absent individual suspicion is valid only if the person being searched
has given his voluntary consent.12 Aside from this consent exception,
the only other way for the government to surpass one's Fourth
Amendment protection is through the very narrow "special needs"
exception, which validates suspicionless searches when the risk to
public safety is substantial, concrete, and not merely hypothetical.' 3
The procedural history of Johnston v. Tampa Sports Authority illus-
trates a legal outlook on event security-specifically pat-down
searches-and how that outlook has changed over the past several
years. The plaintiff season ticket holder of the Tampa Bay Buccaneers
brought suit in Florida state court, claiming that the NFL-mandated
pat-down searches at Buccaneers Stadium violated his right against
unreasonable searches under both the Florida State Constitution and
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.14 The
searches were mandated by the NFL and authorized by the Sports
Authority, and the Buccaneers franchise informed the ticket holder
that his deposit would not be refunded if he refused the searches.' 5
At trial, the defense did not offer any evidence or testimony of a par-
ticular threat to NFL games.'6 The District Court held that the special
needs exception was not satisfied, because the Tampa Sports Author-
ity did not meet its burden of establishing a concrete, substantial
threat of a terrorist attack.' 7 In other words, the special needs excep-
tion is not met by the general fear of terrorism that currently infil-
trates society.'8 In addition, the court found that Johnston did not
11. Id. at 1264.
12. Id. at 1271.
13. Id. at 1265.
14. Id. at .1261.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1266.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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consent, and the searches were unreasonable and unconstitutional on
the rationale that the public interest in not being subject to mass
searches outweighs the generalized fear of terrorist attacks.19
The Florida District Court denied the Sports Authority's motion to
vacate the preliminary injunction against stadium pat-down searches
(an injunction initially granted by the state court); however, the in-
junction was ultimately vacated on appeal and the prior rulings re-
versed.20 The Appellate Court determined that, in the context of
event security, an analysis of the consent exception must precede that
of the special needs exception, and the District Court erred in its ap-
plication of the latter.21 A list of factors taken from both state and
federal approaches to voluntariness was applied to determine whether
Johnston expressly or impliedly consented to the pat-down searches. 22
These factors included: (1) whether the Defendant knew that his con-
duct would subject him to a search; (2) whether a 'vital interest' sup-
ported the search; (3) whether the person conducting the search had
apparent authority to do so; (4) whether the Defendant was advised of
his right to refuse; and (5) whether the defendant would be deprived
of a benefit or right by refusing the search. 23 The Appellate Court
eventually held in favor of the defendant on the grounds that the
plaintiff was an intelligent person who consented to the searches by
voluntarily attending the games knowing fully well what security
would entail. 24 In addition, the season tickets were considered to be
merely a revocable license from the Buccaneers to the ticket holders,
not guaranteeing any rights or privileges to the patrons. 25 The
searches were therefore reasonable under these circumstances, having
fallen within the consent exception. 26 Broadly applying this result to
the context of the Summer Olympic Games, any ticket-holding pa-
trons who attend the events will be subject to pat-downs at the respec-
tive venues and will most likely be regarded as expressly and/or
impliedly consenting to these measures.
Clearly defining the special needs exception has become an arduous
yet essential task, and while the District Court's ruling in Johnston was
eventually vacated, it was not for the misinterpretation of the special
needs exception, but for a misinterpretation of the consent excep-
19. Id. at 1272.
20. Johnston v. Tampa Bay Sports Authority, 530 F.3d 1320, 1330 (11th Cir. 2008).
21. Id. at 1326.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1328.
25. Id. at 1326.
26. Id. at 1328.
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tion.27 The shock following the September 11th attacks proved that
such calamities may never be truly predictable, but courts such as
Johnston have helped create guidelines as to what the exception does
not include. The gravity of the threat alone does not and should not
satisfy whether or not the threat is "substantial" yet the substantial-
ness standard does not require that an attack be certain or immi-
nent.28 To clarify, the Supreme Court has explained that the
exception refers to situations in which the governmental interest in
safety would be put at risk by requiring individual suspicion and the
individual's interest in privacy is minimal. 2 9
It is ultimately the responsibility of the person whose rights have
been personally infringed to bring such claims to court.30 If and when
a citizen chooses to bring such a claim to court, it is likely that the
court will grant a state action. Johnston applied a three-pronged test
for whether conduct constitutes a state action: whether the violating
conduct was caused by (1) the exercise of some right or privilege cre-
ated by the state; (2) a rule of conduct imposed by the state; or (3) a
person for whom the state is responsible.3 ' Even though privately-
hired security groups literally administered the pat-downs at Buc-
caneers Stadium, which is commonplace, a state-run agency hired
those security workers, and the service was paid for with taxpayer dol-
lars. 3 2 This is the situation at most NFL games; therefore, a person
who brings a complaint against mandatory pat-downs on Fourth
Amendment grounds will likely succeed in attaining a state action.
This provides further incentive for Olympic host cities to implement
security practices that do not pose a threat to individual space and
privacy.
B. Effectiveness of Pat-Down Searches and Possible Alternatives
As it turns out, pat-downs may not be effective enough to prevent a
disaster in the first place. The effectiveness of pat-down searches at
NFL games has yet to be proven, because the method has not been
empirically tested, nor has data ever been collected.33 In fact, some
27. Id. at 1326.
28. Johnston, 442 F. Supp. 2d at 1266.
29. Id. at 1269 (quoting Chandler, 520 U.S. at 314).
30. Chicago Park Dist. v. Chicago Bears Football Club, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 58621 (N.D.
Ill., 2006).
31. Johnston, 442 F. Supp. 2d at 1262.
32. Id. at 1263.
33. Michael A. McCann, Social Psychology, Calamities, and Sports Law, 42 Willamette L.
Rev. 585, 608 (2006).
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have argued that invasive pat-down searches do not work at all. 3 4 The
NFL is the only professional sports league to implement mandatory
pat-downs. 35 Major League Baseball, the NBA, and the NHL gener-
ally implement visual searches and bag checks.36 There are also psy-
chological arguments to counter support for mass searches. The only
reason pat-downs were implemented at NFL games in Tampa was be-
cause of a contractual obligation between the Tampa Sporting Author-
ity and the NFL.3 7 This indicates that the risk of an attack was not
great let alone sufficient to satisfy the "special needs" exception to the
Fourth Amendment. In addition, one must take into account the "En-
dowment Effect", which occurs when one perceives the most utility is
provide by the current state of affairs.3 8  Potential for this effect
strengthens as our country tries to find steady footing in the battle
against terror.
Mandated pat-downs are arguably intrusive, but a number of alter-
native security methods are available and may prove equally benefi-
cial, if not more so. Visual checks that involve persons removing
gloves and extending their arms out with palms up would enable se-
curity to detect any possible detonators around the wrists while simul-
taneously allowing attendees personal space.39 Metal detectors are
available, as well as container checks and bag searches. 40 Bag searches
pose little threat to personal privacy or space in that they do not in-
volve physical contact with the bag owner. Motions to enjoin bag
searches will rarely, if ever, be granted, as exemplified in Stauber v.
City of New York 41 (discussed below). These methods prove to be
effective and afford attendees their right to privacy and their right
against unreasonable searches. 42 Furthermore, the options of increas-
ing the number of security personnel or installing enhanced computer
surveillance 4 3 would result in an increased sense of safety at the
Olympic Games without igniting Fourth Amendment debates. In
34. Lara Jakes Jordan, NFL Threat Credibility Questionable, FBI Says, Tampa Tribune, Octo-
ber 19, 2006
35. McCann, supra note 25, at 607.
36. Id.
37. Johnston, 442 F. Supp. 2d at 1269.
38. McCann, supra note 25, at 620.
39. Mike Robinson, Clash over Soldier Field searches goes to court, Associated Press State &
Local Wire, July 21, 2006.
40. Johnston, 442 F. Supp. 2d at 1269.
41. Stauber v. City of New York, et al., 2004 WL 1663600 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2004). Although
this is primarily litigation over protest pens, eleven days after the First Amendment issue was
resolved the court decided not to enjoin the bag searches used in those pens, but rather to
amend the language of the bag search policy.
42. Lara Jakes Jordan, supra note 26.
43. McCann, supra note 25, at 606.
[Vol. 5:73
2008] PAT-DOWN SEARCHES AND PROTEST CAGES
short, there is a wide range of options as far as large-venue security is
concerned, therefore, the constitutional rights of event-attendees and
regular citizens alike need not be infringed in order to ensure their
safety. However, the bottom line is that hosting the Olympic Games
in 2016 will most likely impose more invasive security measures on
event-goers and proximately located Chicago citizens alike, due to the
degree of international attention that the event would bring and the
heightened responsibility for the city to keep the city safe.
The arguments in favor of mass, suspicionless pat-down searches
tend to be either psychological or economic. Michael McCann con-
tends that our country's connections to professional sports teams set
the stage for a deep wound on the national psyche, should there be a
terrorist attack on a major sporting event. 44 Truly, the potential mag-
nitude of such an attack and the mere threat itself cannot be denied.
There is also the notion that a brief pat-down that lasts only a few
seconds is a mere inconvenience when compared to the resulting
peace of mind for all attendees. However, that notion undermines the
basic principle of the Fourth Amendment. In other words, peace of
mind during a sporting event is outweighed by one's peace of mind
regarding his civil liberties. The Supreme Court has ruled that frisks
to be more than a petty indignity,45 and frisks and pat-down searches
are comparable procedures, to say the least.
III. FREEDOM OF SPEECH-How OUR FIRST AMENDMENT
RIGHTS MAY BE AFFECTED
A. Protest Pens and the Rock Against Racism Rule
Crowd control is a significant priority at large scale sporting and
cultural events. Designated demonstration areas referred to as "pro-
test pens" have emerged over the past decade and may include thor-
ough police monitoring and barricades. 4 6 The pens are supposed to be
content-neutral, but persons in charge of security may have motive to
suppress particular content. 4 7 The locations of the protest zones can
have a detrimental effect on the audience the protestors reach. A re-
motely located protest pen will not attract equal attention to centrally-
located protest pen; in effect, the location of the pen can silence the
protestors' message by locating protestors out of reach of the eyes and
ears of the global audience they seek to address.
44. Id. at 604.
45. Johnston, 442 F. Supp. 2d at 1264 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 (1968)).
46. Susan Rachel Nanes, "The Constitutional Infringement Zone": Protest Pens and Demon-
stration Zones at the 2004 National Political Conventions, 66 La. L. Rev. 189, 191 (2005).
47. Id.
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Courts turn to the three-factor test set out in Ward v. Rock Against
Racism to determine whether governmental restrictions against free
speech and assembly are in violation of the First Amendment. 48 The
Rock Against Racism test considers a standard of time, place, and
manner for such restrictions. 4 9 Specifically, when the government at-
tempts to restrict the time, place and manner for exercise of free
speech and assembly in public, the restriction must be (1) justified
without reference to the content of the regulated speech; (2) narrowly
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest; and (3) must
leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the infor-
mation. The factors of content neutrality and open alternative chan-
nels are often satisfied without explanation, and the most problematic
factor tends to be whether the restriction is narrowly tailored.
B. Application of the Rock Against Racism Rule in
Boston and New York
Security at the Democratic and Republican National Conventions
of 2004 involved protest pens. These conventions, located in Boston
and New York, respectively, demonstrated the troubles that ensue
from the utilization of such pens.50 The 2004 conventions serve as a
proper template for a security analysis of future Olympic Games, be-
cause they were the first such events to attract such national and inter-
national media attention after the events of 9/11. Both cities utilized
protest pens as forms of crowd control. The ACLU commenced litiga-
tion against these measures in Coalition to Protest the Democratic Na-
tional Convention v. City of Boston 5' and Stauber v. City of New
York.52
The Democratic National Convention was held in Boston at the
Fleet Center. Security was divided into two sections: a "hard security
zone" requiring clearance for entry, and a "soft security zone" south
of the convention in a city-controlled area including restaurants, bars,
and stores.53 Regular citizens and protestors could enter the soft se-
curity zone without clearance, but the city planned to limit demonstra-
tions to fifty people or fewer. 54 A perimeter of concrete barriers and
eight-foot-tall chain link fences covered with black mesh surrounded
48. Id. at 195 (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989)).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 190.
51. Coalition to Protest the Democratic National Convention v. City of Boston, 327 F. Supp. 2d
61 (D. Mass 2004).
52. Stauber. 2004 WL 159870.
53. 327 F. Supp. 2d at 65.
54. Id.
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the protest area in the soft security zone.55 In this instance, the
protestors' desired audience was the delegates attending the conven-
tions, and in their lawsuit the protestor's claimed that the demonstra-
tion zones were situated so that any protestors would be cut off from
the convention attendees.56 In applying the Rock Against Racism test
to the hard and soft security zones, the trial court focused mainly on
the "narrowly tailored" factor, acknowledging that the pens were not
content-based, and brushing aside the need for alternative channels of
communication for the "constraint of safety".57 Despite the trial
judge's personal visit to the demonstration zone, his reference to the
zone as an 'internment camp'58 , and the consequences which the trial
judge described as "sad," the trial court denied the protestor's motion
for an injunction.5 9 The appellate court affirmed on the grounds that
the security measures were indeed narrowly tailored to the govern-
ment's interests of promoting safety and protecting delegates by keep-
ing the delegates out of throwing-distance of the protestors. 60 The
appellate court also went into a further analysis of the "alternate
channels" factor and noted that the protestors could have went
straight to the media to get their message across.61
The court in Stauber v. City of New York was faced with a situation
very similar to that in Boston, and the ultimate decision turned on the
entry and exit restrictions of the New York protest pens.62 The peti-
tioner-protestors were acting in response to security measures used
the year before at a 2003 anti-war rally, and they moved the court to
enjoin the city from implementing those same practices at the Repub-
lican National Convention.63 The petitioners' argument was based on
the "narrowly tailored" factor of the Rock Against Racism test.64 The
New York protest pens were much larger than the Boston demonstra-
tion zones, and were equipped to hold 80,000 protestors. 65 The pens
extended over thirty Manhattan blocks beginning at 51st Street, the
south end of each block being blocked off for traffic.66 Each block
was turned into an enclosed pen when the space became filled with
55. Id. at 67.
56. Id. at 73.
57. Id. at 75.
58. Id. at 74.
59. Id. at 78.
60. Id. at 73.
61. Id. at 75.
62. Stauber, 2004 WL 159870 at *29.
63. Id. at *2.
64. Id. at *22.
65. Id. at *6.
66. Id. at *4.
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protestors-about 4,000 per block-and the police barricaded the
northern entrance to permit flow of traffic on the other side.67 At
trial, several protestors testified that the policemen would not let them
exit the pen to use the bathroom. Other witnesses testified that the
police threatened not to let exiting protesters back into the pen.6 8
These entry and exit restrictions were essentially what led the court to
grant the plaintiff's injunction.69 In its application of the Rock Against
Racism test, the court determined that although the restrictions were
content-neutral, the New York protest pens did not satisfy the second
two factors of the test.70 The strict entry and exit restrictions rendered
the pens not narrowly tailored, and the pens depleted the option of
alternate channels in that the police would barely allow the protestors
to leave, let alone seek protest elsewhere.71 The rigid deference to
government interest once seen in the Boston courts was not applied in
this New York case, but the outcome would arguably have been differ-
ent if the pens had greater accessibility. Both cases illustrated the sig-
nificance of the "narrowly tailored" nature of security restrictions.
IV. CREATING A "NARROWLY TAILORED" SECURITY SCHEME
FOR THE 2016 CHICAGO OLYMPICS
Potest pens threaten a violation of Chicagoans' First amendment
rights to free speech and assembly. The security practices utilized in
Boston and New York are a helpful starting point in creating a secur-
ity scheme for the city of Chicago, should it host the 2016 Summer
Games. Following the methods that satisfied the Rock Against Ra-
cism test in Stauber and Boston (i.e., working with the strengths and
learning from the weaknesses of the protest pens in those cases), a
demonstration zone narrowly tailored to the government's interests in
crowd control can be formulated for the downtown Chicago area.
However, an important difference between the political conventions
and the Olympic Games is the audience which the protestors seek to
address. As opposed to the protests at the political conventions, the
audience sought by the protestors at the Olympic Games would likely
be the global media, not particular attendees of the games. This al-
lows for the designated areas for such protestors to have a greater
degree of flexibility while still fulfilling the purpose of the protest.
67. Id.
68. Id. at *6.
69. Id. at *29.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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The Boston method of "hard' and "soft" security zones would be a
good fit to the highly-populated downtown areas near the Olympic
sites, and the size and layout of the Manhattan protest pens would
better suit Chicago's grid-system of streets. A number of different
venues will host the many events72, but McCormick Place and Wash-
ington Park are good examples of the more populated areas in which
the games will take place. The hard security zone would require clear-
ance within the perimeters of McCormick Place, Washington Park,
and the other various venues. Specifically, the McCormick Place hard
security zone would be bordered by East Cermack Road, South Mar-
tin Luther King Jr. Drive, East Twenty-fourth Place, and South Indi-
ana Avenue.73 The Washington Park hard security zone would be
bordered by South Martin Luther King Jr. Drive, East Fifty-first
Street, South College Grove Avenue, and East Sixtieth Street.74 Pat-
downs and bag searches could be conducted in the hard security
zones. The soft security zone would run along South Martin Luther
King Jr. Drive between the two hard zones, and also extend north-
ward to East Eighteenth Street, southward to East Sixty-third Street,
westward to Michigan Avenue, and eastward to South Drexel
Boulevard.75 Demonstrations would be prohibited in the hard zone,
but protestors can attract just as much media attention through place-
ment merely several blocks north of the Games. Police can prepare
for protestors in the soft security zone in the New York manner by
barricading the south end of each block along the stretch of Martin
Luther King Jr. Drive that sits in the soft security zone-this would be
more of a traffic-control measure than a space-restriction for protes-
tors. A benefit of this plan is that it does not limit the number of
protestors that may assemble in these areas. In addition, pat-down
searches would be limited to the hard-security zone, the zone that
would mainly house athletes, fans, and those people directly involved
in the Games.
The security zones described above would satisfy any court's Rock
Against Racism analysis. A particular strength of both the Boston and
New York pens was that they were content neutral, as would be the
demonstration zones in Chicago. Both the hard and soft security
zones are narrowly tailored in that the areas around McCormick Place
and Washington Park, along with the soft security closer to the Loop,
72. Chicago 2016 Bid Committee Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.chicago2016.org/
faq.aspx (last visited January 11, 2009).
73. See http://www.google.com/maps
74. Id.
75. Id.
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will ensure the protection of the event-goers while respecting the pri-
vacy of people who live and work in those areas. There would be no
risk of restricted entry or exit from the protest zone like there was in
Stauber, because the soft security zone will not require clearance by
security personnel. Alternative channels of communication remain
open, as Millennium Park, Grant Park, and even Daley Plaza will be
out of reach of the soft security zones.
Those in favor of stricter security for the sake of public safety may
argue that this method of hard and soft security zones reduces crowd
control. The potential weakness of this model turns on the accessibil-
ity of the soft security zone. The soft zone could be criticized as too
accessible, thereby diminishing the police power in that area. How-
ever, the Stauber opinion illustrates that the accessibility of a protest
zone is fundamental in its function as a forum of free speech. Also,
the Boston case exemplifies how prison-like protest pens have been
approved by some courts. The city of Chicago can avoid similar litiga-
tion by refusing to construct pens for expected demonstrators that are,
in effect, cages.
V. CONCLUSION
Despite the chilling effects of the war on terror on our country's
psyche, the question of how to uphold the right of privacy in this cli-
mate of fear is ultimately for the courts to answer, not for emotion-
ally-driven social policy. The scope of the constitutional protections
for free speech and against unreasonable searches will be tested
against private security measures and the police powers of Illinois if
Chicago hosts the 2016 Summer Olympics. The entities in charge of
security need not violate these rights to maintain order at this high-
profile event. Security can conduct non-invasive pat-down searches in
the hard security zones established at the game sites, and demonstra-
tion zones can be designated reasonably close to McCormick Place
and Washington Park. Protestors can thereby target the same audi-
ence with equal effectiveness. Nonetheless, the risk remains for city
officials sacrificing these alternatives for harsher and more provoca-
tive security measures in planning for a worst case scenario, and want-
ing to send a message or certain image of orderliness to the world.
The benefits a city receives from hosting the Olympics are formidable,
to say the least, but the subsequent limitations to Chicagoan's consti-
tutional rights in the name of security can not be overshadowed by the
almighty dollar. Hosting the games will give the city a responsibility
to keep its citizens safe, but also to show the world how seriously Chi-
[Vol. 5:73
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cago considers individual civil liberties and the values expressed in our
Constitution.
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